LANGUAGE FROM THE NOVEMBER 2007 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON IRAN COMPARED WITH

THE NEW YORK TIMES HEADLINE AND OPENING PARAGRAPHS

The New York Times, December 4, 2007, "U.S. Intelligence Finding Says Iran Halted Its Nuclear Arms Effort in 2003"

   A new assessment by American intelligence agencies released Monday concludes that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003 and that the program remains frozen, contradicting a judgment two years ago that Tehran was working relentlessly toward building a nuclear bomb.

     The conclusions of the new assessment are likely to reshape the final year of the Bush administration, which has made halting Iran's nuclear program a cornerstone of its foreign policy.

     The assessment, a National Intelligence Estimate that represents the consensus view of all 16 American spy agencies, states that Tehran is likely to keep its options open with respect to building a weapon, but that intelligence agencies ''do not know whether it currently intends to develop nuclear  weapons.'' 

      Iran is continuing to produce enriched uranium, a program that the Tehran government has said is intended for civilian purposes. The new estimate says that the enrichment program could still provide Iran with enough raw material to produce a nuclear weapon sometime by the middle of next decade, a timetable essentially unchanged from previous estimates.

     But the new report essentially disavows a judgment that the intelligence agencies issued in 2005, which concluded that Iran had an active secret arms program intended to transform the raw material into a nuclear weapon. The new estimate declares instead with ''high confidence'' that the military-run program was shut in 2003, and it concludes with ''moderate confidence'' that the program remains frozen. The report judges that the halt was imposed by Iran ''primarily in response to increasing international scrutiny and pressure.''

Language from the November 2007 NIE - Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities

Section A

We judge with high confidence that in the Fall of 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program; we also assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons.

We judge with high confidence that the halt lasted at least several years. (Because of intelligence gaps discussed elsewhere in this Estimate, however, DOE and the NIC assess with only moderate confidence that the halt to those activities represents a halt to Iran's entire nuclear weapons program).

We assess with moderate confidence Tehran had not restarted its nuclear weapons program as of mid-2007, but we do not know whether it currently intends to develop nuclear weapons.

Section B

We cannot rule out that Iran has acquired from abroad—or will acquire in the future—a nuclear weapon or enough fissile material for a weapon.

Section E

We do not have sufficient intelligence to judge confidently whether Tehran is willing to maintain the halt of its nuclear weapons program indefinitely while it weighs its

options, or whether it will or already has set specific deadlines or criteria that will prompt it to restart the program.

In our judgment, only an Iranian political decision to abandon a nuclear weapons objective would plausibly keep Iran from eventually producing nuclear weapons—and such a decision is inherently reversible.

Section H

We assess with high confidence that Iran has the scientific, technical, and industrial capacity eventually to produce nuclear weapons if it decides to do so.